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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly refuse to consider the fax cover sheet in its 
construction of the Limited Listing Agreement? 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the February 27, 2002 letter from 
Burgess to ARC, the eventual purchaser of the mobile home park, did not modify the 
terms of the Limited Listing Agreement? 
3. Did the trial court correctly reject Riverside's fraud claim against Burgess? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises out of an action commenced by The Burgess Company 
("Burgess") against Riverside Mobile Home Park, L.L.C. and its principals (collectively 
"Riverside") to collect a real estate commission due and owing to Burgess upon the sale 
of the Riverside Mobile Home Park (the "Property"), pursuant to the Limited Listing 
Agreement between the parties. Riverside sold the Property to ARC, a buyer presented 
by Burgess and coming under the terms of the Limited Listing Agreement. That sale, for 
$4,600,000, obligated Riverside to pay a commission of 4% to Burgess under the express 
terms of the Limited Listing Agreement. Riverside breached its contract with Burgess by 
failing and refusing to pay Burgess the 4% commission owed to it under the terms of the 
Limited Listing Agreement, and, in fact, by failing and refusing to pay Burgess any 
commission whatsoever for its sale of the Property to ARC. 
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B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. On July 1, 2001, Riverside entered into a Limited Listing Agreement with 
Burgess. (R. at 160-61, 169.) 
2. Under the terms of the Limited Listing Agreement, Riverside agreed to pay 
Burgess a 4% commission upon the sale of the Riverside Mobile Home Park "to any 
person or entity (including successors, assigns or affiliates) with whom Agent has 
properly registered with Owner." (R. at 160-61.) The Limited Listing Agreement further 
identified "Affordable Residential Communities (ARC)" as a person or entity with whom 
Burgess was authorized to pursue the sale of the Riverside Mobile Home Park. IcL 
3. The term of the Limited Listing Agreement was for 180 days from July 1, 
2001 and for 180 calendar days thereafter in the event the Riverside Mobile Home Park 
was contracted or sold to a party with whom the Burgess Company was authorized to 
negotiate. Id Thus the total term of the Limited Listing Agreement with regard to 
parties with whom The Burgess Company was authorized to deal extended to at least late 
June, 2002. IcL 
4. Under the Limited Listing Agreement it was acknowledged and agreed that 
ARC was a party with whom Burgess was authorized to negotiate concerning the sale of 
the Riverside Mobile Home Park. (R. at 160.) 
5. In or around March, 2002, Riverside and ARC entered into a Real Estate 
Sale Agreement contemplating a sale of the Riverside Mobile Home Park to ARC at a 
sale price of $4,600,000. (R. at 143-44, ]f 3.) 
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6. On May 3, 2002, Riverside conveyed to ARC the Riverside Mobile Home 
Park in exchange for $4,600,000 paid in cash. (R. at 144 ^ 4, 146, 168-69.) 
7. Under the terms of the Limited Listing Agreement, Burgess is owed by 
Riverside a commission of 4% on the $4,600,000 sale price on the sale of the Riverside 
Mobile Home Park from Riverside to ARC, which commission is totals $184,000. (R. at 
169.) Riverside has failed and refused to pay any commission to Burgess in connection 
with the sale of the Riverside Mobile Home Park to ARC. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment in this case was correct as a matter of 
law. Because Riverside cannot dispute the foregoing facts, it is clearly obligated to pay 
Burgess a 4% commission on the $4.6 million dollar sale, under the indisputable terms of 
the Limited Listing Agreement. 
Riverside's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, Riverside 
complains that the trial court erred in not considering a fax cover sheet transmitted with 
the Limited Listing Agreement, which it alleges evidenced a side agreement between 
Burgess and a third party to split the 4% commission from Riverside. Even assuming the 
existence of such an agreement, that agreement is of no effect on the entirely separate 
Limited Listing Agreement, which on its face obligates Riverside to pay the full 4% 
commission directly to Burgess. It is also inadmissible parol evidence. 
Second, Riverside complains that the trial court erred in not considering the 
February 27, 2002 letter from Burgess to ARC ("February Letter"), which Riverside 
argues somehow modifies the clear and express terms of the Limited Listing Agreement, 
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However, like the fax cover sheet, the letter is wholly extraneous to the issues on appeal 
and has no relevance whatsoever to construction of the Limited Listing Agreement. 
Furthermore, the letter is inadmissible evidence of a modification of the 4% commission 
term under the Limited Listing Agreement and is itself unenforceable as a modification 
under the Statute of Frauds. Regardless, the letter simply does not say what Riverside 
claims it says and, in reality, demonstrates that Burgess did not agree to any modification 
of the Limited Listing Agreement. 
Third, Riverside complains that the trial court erred in not considering evidence of 
allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations by Burgess. Quite aside from the fact that 
Burgess made no such misrepresentations, any representations by Burgess were known 
by Riverside prior to the sale of the Property, and Riverside cannot now attempt to avoid 
its obligations under the Limited Listing Agreement after having accepted the benefits of 
that Agreement with full knowledge of the now asserted facts. 
Riverside voluntarily entered into the Limited Listing Agreement with Burgess to 
pay 4% as a commission on a sale of the Property to ARC, the buyer presented by 
Burgess. That sale occurred and Riverside has received and accepted the benefits of the 
Limited Listing Agreement. The 4% commission is therefore due and owing and the trial 
court's judgment so finding should be summarily affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE FAX 
COVER SHEET IN CONSTRUING THE LIMITED LISTING 
AGREEMENT. 
A. The Cover Sheet is Irrelevant. 
The trial court correctly refused to consider the fax cover sheet in construing the 
Limited Listing Agreement for the very simple reason that it is entirely irrelevant. 
Riverside's lengthy and flawed analysis of the parol evidence rule completely misses the 
point. The sole parties to the Limited Listing Agreement are Burgess and Riverside. The 
fax cover sheet, on the other hand, is, at best, a side agreement between Burgess and 
Realty West, an entity that is not even a party to the Limited Listing Agreement. As 
such, it can have no legal effect whatsoever on the clear and unambiguous terms of the 
Limited Listing Agreement between Burgess and Riverside. The Limited Listing 
Agreement on its face obligates Riverside to pay to Burgess a 4% commission on the sale 
of the Property by Riverside to the buyer presented by Burgess. It is simply irrelevant to 
this case whether Burgess is then obligated under some other agreement to split that 
commission with a third party. Regardless of whether the fax cover sheet constitutes an 
enforceable agreement between Burgess and Realty West, it cannot, and does not, in any 
way alleviate Riverside of its contractual obligation to pay Burgess the full 4% 
commission mandated by the Limited Listing Agreement. The trial court correctly 
refused to consider the fax cover sheet because it was irrelevant to the court's 
construction of the Limited Listing Agreement. 
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B. The Cover Sheet is Inadmissible Parol Evidence. 
The fax cover sheet is not only irrelevant to this case but is also inadmissible 
under the Utah parol evidence rule. Under Utah law, parol or extrinsic evidence is 
inadmissible for the purpose of varying or modifying the terms of an integrated 
agreement, unless the court concludes that the terms of the contract are ambiguous.1 
Spears v. Reynolds, 2002 UT 24 ffij 18-19, 44 P.3d 742. If the terms are ambiguous, then 
the court may consider parol evidence to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the 
contract in order to resolve any ambiguities. If the terms of the contract are not 
ambiguous, then parol evidence is absolutely inadmissible in construing the contract. 
WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,1f 19, 54 P.3d 1139, 1145. 
The trial court held that the Limited Listing Agreement was not ambiguous and 
therefore refused to consider any parol evidence in construing the plain language of the 
contract. (R. at 322, p. 11.) Riverside takes issues with this conclusion—not by arguing 
that the contract was ambiguous—but rather by arguing that the fax cover sheet 
demonstrates that the Limited Listing Agreement was not an integrated contract. 
Riverside therefore argues that the trial court should have considered the cover sheet to 
determine whether the Limited Listing Agreement was an integrated contract. 
In support of its argument, Riverside cites to a handful of Utah cases, which it 
suggests require a court to consider extrinsic evidence for the purpose of determining the 
intentions of the contracting parties in construing the contract. However, without 
1
 Cf. Flying J Inc. v. Comdata Network, Inc., 405 F.3d 821, 831 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Utah 
law is unsettled on the issue whether the court may go beyond the four comers of the 
contract to determine whether the contract is ambiguous.") 
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exception, these cases all go to the issue of detennining whether the contract is 
ambiguous, not whether it is integrated. In citing to these cases, Riverside is confusing 
apples with oranges. Riverside has not argued in its brief that the terms of the Limited 
Listing Agreement are ambiguous, and the trial court concluded they were not. Utah case 
law is clear that in an unambiguous contract, the parties' intentions are determined within 
the four corners of the agreement. WebBank, 2002 UT 88, f 19, 54 P.3d 1139, 1145. 
Parol evidence cannot be considered in construing an unambiguous contract. 
Lacking any Utah case law support for its proposition that the court should 
consider the cover sheet in detennining whether the Limited Listing Agreement is an 
integrated agreement, Riverside instead turns to case law from other jurisdictions, namely 
Pennsylvania, Vennont, and Ohio. However, it is well established that contract 
interpretation is fundamentally an issue of state law. The Limited Listing Agreement is 
indisputably governed by Utah law. Contract law from other jurisdictions is therefore of 
no use whatsoever in analyzing the parol evidence rule under Utah law. 
Nor are the cases cited by Riverside helpful to Riverside's argument. Even in 
those states which appear to pemiit consideration of extrinsic evidence in detennining 
whether an agreement is integrated, that inquiry is limited. The court in Steinke v. 
Sungard Fin. Svs.. Inc., 121 F.3d 763 (5in Cir. 1997), one of the cases cited by Riverside 
in its brief, explains Pennsylvania law as follows: 
In detennining whether an agreement is integrated, a court 
must compare both the alleged oral and written agreements 
and must determine whether the parties, situations were the 
ones to the contract, would naturally and nonnally include the 
one in the other if it were made. If the alleged oral and 
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written agreements relate to the same subject matter and are 
so interrelated that both would be executed at the same time 
and in the same contract, the scope of the subsidiary 
agreement must be taken to be covered by the writing. In 
such cases, parol evidence to vary, modify or supersede the 
written contract is inadmissible in evidence. 
Id. at 770 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Such are the circumstances of this case. The Limited Listing Agreement clearly 
and unambiguously states that Burgess is owed a 4% commission. Riverside argues that 
the cover letter proves the parties did not really mean for the Limited Listing Agreement 
to be the final word on Burgess' commission. The Limited Listing Agreement and the 
cover letter therefore both relate to the same subject matter and are so interrelated that the 
Limited Listing Agreement supersedes any allegedly contrary provisions in the cover 
letter. The cover letter is therefore inadmissible parol evidence, even under Pennsylvania 
law. 
Because the unambiguous terms of the Limited Listing Agreement entitle Burgess 
to a 4% commission on the sale of the property, and because the Limited Listing 
Agreement supersedes any prior or contemporaneous agreement to the contrary, the fax 
cover sheet is inadmissible parol evidence. The trial court therefore correctly refused to 
consider the cover sheet in construing the Limited Listing Agreement. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE 
FEBRUARY 27 LETTER FROM BURGESS TO ARC IN ITS SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ANALYSIS. 
A. The February 27 Letter is Irrelevant. 
The February 27 letter is irrelevant to this case and this appeal for the same reason 
that the fax cover letter is irrelevant. Riverside claims that the letter indicates that 
Burgess expected to split the total commission for the sale of the Property with Realty 
West. However, this case is not a claim by Realty West against Burgess for half of the 
commission on the property. In fact, Realty West has made no such claim against 
Burgess. This case is simply about the commission owed by Riverside to Burgess under 
the Limited Listing Agreement to which Riverside and Burgess are the sole parties. No 
possible interpretation of the February 27 letter changes the plain and simple fact that the 
Limited Listing Agreement obligates Riverside to pay to Burgess a 4% commission on 
the sale of the Property, regardless of any other agreement that might exist independently 
for Burgess to split its commission with Realty West, Greg Hales, or anyone else for that 
matter. 
Furthermore, the February 27 letter does not in any way involve or pertain to 
Riverside. The letter was sent by Burgess to ARC and does not even mention Riverside 
or the Limited Listing Agreement to which Burgess and Riverside are the sole parties. It 
is beyond comprehension how Riverside could claim that this letter could have any effect 
whatsoever on its legal obligations to Burgess or why it continues to assert purported 
claims by third parties against Burgess in an appeal of a summary judgment ruling 
against Riverside. 
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B. The Letter is Inadmissible and Unenforceable under the Statute of 
Frauds. 
Riverside also erroneously argues that the February 27 letter proves that Burgess 
and Riverside agreed to modify the commission owed to Burgess under their Limited 
Listing Agreement. However, this letter is inadmissible as evidence of a modification to 
the Limited Listing Agreement under the Statute of Frauds and is obviously not 
enforceable as an independent agreement to modify the Limited Listing Agreement 
because it is not even between Burgess and Riverside. 
Under the Utah Statute of Frauds, agreements for the payment of a real estate 
commission must be in writing: 
The following agreements are void unless the 
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is 
in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement: . . . 
(5) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sale real estate for compensation; . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1996). When an agreement is required to be in writing under 
the Statute of Frauds, that agreement cannot be modified by a subsequent oral agreement. 
Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) ('The rule is well settled in 
Utah that if an original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement 
which modifies the original agreement must also satisfy the requirements of the statute of 
frauds to be enforceable."); Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 267 P. 1020, 1032 (Utah 
1928). Therefore, the February letter is not admissible evidence of an alleged 
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modification to the Limited Listing Agreement because no written modification exists, 
and no such modification ever occurred. 
Riverside alternatively argues that the February 27 letter from Burgess to ARC 
itself modifies the terms of the Limited Listing Agreement. Riverside's argument 
likewise fails under the Statute of Frauds because it does not constitute a written 
modification between Riverside and Burgess. It is a letter between Burgess and ARC. 
Moreover, in reality, the letter actually evidences Mr. Burgess' disagreement with the 
proposal to modify the commission term of the Limited Listing Agreement and proposes 
an alternative which was never accepted by Riverside. That letter cannot, by any stretch 
of the imagination, be found to constitute an agreement to modify the commission term 
of the Limited Listing Agreement. 
The trial court, in entering judgment, correctly refused to consider the February 
letter for any purpose and correctly found that no modification of the Limited Listing 
Agreement had occurred. 
2
 Riverside erroneously asserts in its Statement of Facts that "Riverside and [Burgess] 
modified their agreement regarding commissions by lowering the commission to two 
percent (2%), with one percent (1%) being paid to [Burgess] and one percent (1%) being 
paid to Realty West. This modification was reflected in the Purchase Contract." 
(Appellant's Br. at 8.) What Riverside notably fails to mention is that Burgess was not a 
party to the Purchase Contract and, therefore, the Purchase Contract could not possibly 
constitute a modification of the Limited Listing Agreement binding upon Burgess. 
Riverside essentially concedes as much by not so much as mentioning this argument in 
the body of its brief, let alone providing any legal analysis whatsoever. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED RIVERSIDE'S FRAUD 
CLAIMS AGAINST BURGESS. 
A. Riverside's Fraud Claim is Defeated by the Doctrines of Waiver, 
Estoppel, and Ratification. 
Riverside complains that the trial court erroneously rejected its claims that 
Burgess fraudulently induced Riverside to enter into the Limited Listing Agreement. 
Riverside claims that Burgess did so by misrepresenting the Property's market value to 
ARC, and thereby obtained a $5.5 million offer from ARC which it used to induce 
Riverside to sign the Limited Listing Agreement. Riverside argues that it would not have 
entered into the Limited Listing Agreement had it known that the sales price for the 
Property would be $4.6 million rather than $5.5 million. 
However, Riverside ultimately agreed to sell the property for $4.6 million to 
ARC, the buyer presented to Riverside by Burgess, having full knowledge of the facts it 
now complains of, including Burgess' role in that sale and the representations allegedly 
made by Burgess to ARC and Riverside. Utah law is clear that a party to a contract 
cannot accept the benefits of the contract, with full knowledge of the facts, and thereafter 
attempt to disaffirm its obligations under the same contract based on those facts. Estate 
of Flake, 2000 UT 17 fflf 29-31, 71 P.3d 589; Durbano Metals. Inc. v. A & K Railroad 
Materials, Inc., 574 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Utah 1978); Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, 
Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah 1976) ("[W]here one has entered into a contract where 
fraud may be involved, after having knowledge of those facts, continues to perform or 
otherwise ratify the contract, he is deemed to waive the claim of fraud.") Riverside has 
therefore waived any fraud claim it might purport to have against Burgess. 
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Similarly, under the doctrine of estoppel, a party is estopped or precluded from 
arguing that it has no obligation under an agreement having accepted the benefits of that 
agreement. Murray v. Monter, 60 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah 1936) ('The corporate liability 
where the corporation accepts and retains the benefits of a promoter's contract is on the 
theory of implied contract or of estoppel. The rule is quite uniform that if a corporation 
with knowledge of a contract accepts the benefits thereof it will be required to perform 
the obligations.") 
Further, under the doctrine of ratification, a party which has accepted performance 
under the contract thereby ratifies the contract and is precluded from arguing that facts 
known to it at the time of its ratification should now support a claim to disavow the 
contract. Bezner, 548 P.2d at 901; Hull v. Flinders, 27 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1933) 
("[Wjhere one having entered into a contract induced by fraud, after being fully informed 
of the fraud, voluntarily confirms, ratifies, performs and exacts performance of the 
contract, thereby condones the fraud, that such ratification relates to the timing of the 
contract, confirms it from its date, and purges it of the fraud."); Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 
P.2d 461, 462 (Utah 1984). 
Upon learning that ARC would not pay $5.5 million for the Property, Riverside 
could have simply walked away harmless from the Limited Listing Agreement and found 
a different buyer that was willing to pay its full asking price. Instead, Riverside took full 
advantage of the benefits of the Limited Listing Agreement by accepting the buyer 
presented to it by Burgess, agreeing to reduce the sales price for the Property, and then 
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pocketing $4.6 million and walking away without paying a dime in commission to 
Burgess. 
Under the foregoing authorities, Riverside is precluded from attempting to avoid 
its obligations to Burgess under the Limited Listing Agreement, after having accepted the 
benefits of that Agreement in the sale of the Property to ARC. 
B. Riverside's Allegations of Fraud are not Supported by the Evidence. 
Furthermore, Riverside's allegations that it would not have entered into the 
Limited Listing Agreement with Burgess had Burgess not represented that it had a buyer 
willing to pay $5.5 million for the Property are belied by the unambiguous language of 
the Limited Listing Agreement. Nowhere in the Limited Listing Agreement is there a 
requirement that the sales price be no less than 5.5 million. In fact, the Limited Listing 
Agreement clearly contemplates on its face that the sales price for the Property might be 
other than $5.5 million dollars: 
In the event Agent is successful in procuring a Buyer, Owner 
agrees to pay Agent 4.00% of the value of the Property 
agreed to and payable in cash upon close of escrow only. 
(R. at 160-61.) The Limited Listing Agreement set no minimum sales price as a 
condition for payment of the 4% commission to Burgess. Riverside's argument therefore 
flies in the face of the clear and unambiguous language of the Limited Listing Agreement 
and must be disregarded by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly refused to consider the fax cover sheet or the February 
letter in construing the Limited Listing Agreement between Riverside and Burgess 
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because they are irrelevant, inadmissible, and of no legal effect. The trial also correctly 
rejected Riverside's fraud claims against Burgess because, having full knowledge of the 
allegations it now complains of, Riverside took full advantage of the benefits of Limited 
Listing Agreement and now attempts to avoid its obligations to Burgess under that same 
agreement. 
As a matter of law, Riverside is obligated to pay Burgess a 4% commission on the 
sale of the Property to ARC. This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's ruling in 
all respects. 
DATED t h i s ^ / d a y of February, 2006. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY^ORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
By-
Robert S. Campbell 
Scott M. Lilja 
Nicole M. Deforge 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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